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ABSTRACT

Over the last fifty years, in cases involving the institutionalpress, the
United States Supreme Court has offered characterizationsof the purpose,
duty, role, and value of the press in a democracy. An examination of the
tone and quality of these characterizationsover time suggests a downward
trend, with largely favorable and praising characterizationsof the press
devolving into characterizationsthat are more distrustingand disparaging.
This Essay explores this trend, setting forth evidence of the Court's
changing view of the media-from the effusively complimentary depictions
of the media during the Glory Days of the 1960s and 1970s to the more
skeptical, tepid, or derogatory portrayals in recent years. It considers
possible causes of this change in rhetoric and then explores the potential
First Amendment consequences of the change. The Essay argues that there
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is a very real risk that these trends could lead to the impoverishment of a
wider array ofFirstAmendment rights. Because the jurisprudentialpattern
has long suggested that general speakers and press speakers rise andfall
together, wider First Amendment values that have been enhanced in U.S.
Supreme Court cases brought by the positively characterizedmedia could
be diminished as the Court's view of the media diminishes. The downward
trend in press characterizations may therefore be cause for broader
concern about the vitality andstability ofFirstAmendment rights.
I. INTRODUCTION

New York Times v. Sullivan' marked a crucial moment for the United
States Supreme Court for many reasons. It signaled a breaking point
against a tool of intimidation in the civil rights movement in the gridlocked
South.2 It constitutionalized U.S. libel law and ushered in a uniquely
American approach to defamation actions. 3 It opened the door to an era of
vibrant, free-flowing dialogue about government and those who govern.4
But Sullivan was also a defining moment from the Supreme Court in
another way: It was a watershed opinion for the Court's use of rhetoric
expressing appreciation for and admiration of the media and its role in our
society. Subsequent Sullivan-era cases are likewise rife with this same
brand of press-praising language-positive characterizations of the media
as a democracy-enhancing,
power-checking, community-building
institution with a critical role to play in informing, educating, and
empowering a voting public.5 In sometimes extensive commentary in these
cases, the Court offered the American public a deeply optimistic portrayal
of the institutional media and conveyed a sense of gratitude for its social
1.
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2.
See, e.g., Kermit L. Hall, "Lies, Lies, Lies ": The Origins of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 9
COMM. L. & POL'Y 391, 392 (2004) (arguing that the decision was a critical decision for the civil rights
movement in the South); Howard M. Wasserman, A JurisdictionalPerspective on New York Times v.
Sullivan, 107 Nw. U. L. REv. 901, 909 (2013) (discussing how government officials in the South used
libel suits to silence civil rights activists).
3.
See, e.g., Stanley S. Arkin & Luther A. Granquist, The Presumption of General Damages in
the Law of Constitutional Libel, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1482, 1482 (1968) (highlighting how the U.S.
Supreme Court first declared libel laws subject to First Amendment limitations in Sullivan); William W.
Van Alstyne, First Amendment Limitations on Recovery from the Press-An Extended Comment on
"The Anderson Solution, " 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 793, 793 (1984) (footnotes omitted) (noting that in
Sullivan, "the Supreme Court switched the orbit of libel law from far out frozen darkness to the sunny
warmth of the first amendment").
4.
See Susan Dente Ross & R. Kenton Bird, The Ad That Changed Libel Law: Judicial Realism
and Social Activism in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 9 COMM. L. & POL'Y 489, 522-23 (2004)
(describing how Sullivan allowed for greater criticism of government officials).
5.
See infra text accompanying notes 9-38.
6.
See RonNell Andersen Jones, The Dangers of Press Clause Dicta, 48 GA. L. REv. 705, 707
(2014) [hereinafter Jones, Press Clause Dicta].
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and constitutional functions. It boldly and repeatedly told America that the
press mattered, and it told America why.
In the fifty years since Sullivan, though, the Supreme Court's
depictions of the media have changed. The Court now appears both less
likely to take cases involving the press and less likely to offer a positive
characterization of the press in the cases that it does take. This Essay
examines this trend in the tone and content of the language the Court uses
when it portrays the media in its opinions. Part II outlines the apparent
trajectory of these characterizations, charting a movement from largely
favorable and praising depictions of the press to largely distrusting and
dismissive ones. It explores earlier portrayals of the press as an educator, a
dialogue builder, and a watchdog, and then contrasts those
characterizations with more recent depictions of the press that take a
decidedly less positive tone. Part III offers some possibilities of what might
be driving this change in characterization, exploring changes in Court
composition, changes in media quality and delivery mechanisms, and
changes in public opinion that could be influencing the changes in judicial
characterization. Part IV concludes with an analysis of why this pattern of
characterizations matters. It highlights some more evident concerns related
to the direct effect that the Court's changing depictions of the media might
have on the operation of the journalistic enterprise and on the many
Americans who consume that journalistic work product. Beyond this, it
also describes some potentially less obvious concerns about the broader
effect that this development might have on a larger body of constitutional
jurisprudence. The Essay argues that the downward trend in press
characterizations may be cause for much deeper concern about the vitality
of wider First Amendment rights held by speakers other than the media.
II. A DIMINISHING VIEW OF THE PRESS
An examination of the tone and quality of the descriptive language that
the Court uses when it speaks 7 of the institutional press suggests a
diminishing trend over time. In a smattering of pre-Sullivan cases and then
very consistently throughout a period that we might call the press "Glory

7.
Elsewhere I have recently addressed the unique form that characterizations of the press often
take: they are delivered by the Court in nonbinding but heavily suggestive dicta in cases that do not
actually set forth any special rights for the press but instead offer more sweeping holdings about the
First Amendment free speech rights of all citizens. See id. I have suggested that the excessive use of this
tool is troubling and have argued that statements about the press in dicta, unnecessary to the outcome of
the case, give rise to serious risk of confusion and evasion of stare decisis in lower courts. Id. at 722.
This dicta-based lack of clarity is objectionable, not merely because it falls outside the justiciability
bounds of the Court's legitimate purview but also because in the area of expressive freedoms it has long
been recognized that clarity is especially crucial. Id. at 723.
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Days" 8 of the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s, the Court went out of its way

to speak of the press and then offered effusively complimentary depictions
of the media in its opinions. In the years since, the Court appears to have
devolved into a period in which it actively avoids taking press-focused
cases or speaking of the press, and then embraces none of the
complimentary characterizations when it does speak of it.
Several strands of the Glory Days depictions are worthy of note.9
A.

Characterizationsof the Pressas Educator

In the Glory Days characterizations of the media, the Supreme Court
sent a very public signal that it viewed the press as a valuable educator. It
painted a picture of the press as a helpful teacher with a gift for both
determining what the people need to know and conveying it to them in a
useful fashion. The cases from this era praise the media for "informing the
citizenry of public events and occurrences,"' 0 and emphasize repeatedly
that this role matters greatly because "' [a]n untrammeled press [is] a vital
source of public information,' . . . and an informed public is the essence of
working democracy."" In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,12 for
example, the Court characterizes the press as crucially important to "public
understanding of the rule of law and to comprehension of the functioning
of the entire criminal justice system. ,,13 It calls the press the "chief' source
of citizens' information.1 4 Notably, the Glory Days cases consistently
create a link between this educator role and the media's role as a
8.
See generally Lucy A. Dalglish & Casey Murray, Dej6 Vu All over Again: How a Generation
of Gains in FederalReporter's PrivilegeLaw Is Being Reversed, 29 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 13,
18 (2006); RonNell Andersen Jones, Media Subpoenas: Impact, Perception, and Legal Protection in
the Changing World ofAmerican Journalism,84 WASH. L. REV. 317, 318-20 (2009) [hereinafter Jones,
Media Subpoenas]; RonNell Andersen Jones, Rethinking Reporter's Privilege, 111 MICH. L. REV.
1221, 1222-24 (2013). Cf Margot Adler, Court Cases Batter Protectionfor Journalists (National
Public Radio Broadcast Aug. 20, 2004), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=3861113
(observing that "[]ournalists are much less respected by the public and the judiciary" and noting the
argument of First Amendment lawyer Floyd Abrams that "the notion of the journalist as a romantic
hero, Robert Redford, for example, has faded away, and there really has been a growing hostility to the
press, which I think is reflected in some of these decisions.").
9.
Discussions of a number of these cases and their effusive pro-media rhetoric can be found in
RonNell Andersen Jones, U.S. Supreme Court Justices and Press Access, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1791
(2012) [hereinafter Jones, Press Access].
10.
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965).
11.
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585 (1983)
(alternation in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250
(1936).
12.
448 U.S. 555 (1980).
13.
Id. at 573 (quoting Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in judgment)).
14.
Id. For a more extensive discussion of the characterizations in this case, see Jones, Press
Clause Dicta, supra note 6, at 706.
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"surrogate" or proxy for members of the wider public at events of import,15
when constraints on time, space, knowledge, or ability keep the individual
citizen from participating directly. The portrayals are of an entity that will
do the hard work of finding out what is happening in the democracy, and
then pass along the information to those who could not or would not glean
it for themselves.
Language from Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn16 provides another
powerful example of the way that the Court depicts the press as an
indispensable entity for educating the voting public: "[I]n a society in
which each individual has but limited time and resources with which to
observe at first hand the operations of his government, he relies necessarily
upon the press to bring to him in convenient form the facts of those
operations." 7 The opinion calls this teaching role the "great responsibility"
that is met by the press, and conveys the Court's view that if the nation did
not have these key community educators who report "fully and accurately
the proceedings of government," the society of informed, participatory
citizens that is envisioned by the Constitution could not be a reality. 8
Indeed, the Court notes, "[w]ithout the information provided by the press
most of us and many of our representatives would be unable to vote
intelligently or to register opinions on the administration of government

generally." 19
B.

Characterizationsof the Press as DialogueBuilder

The Glory Days characterizations also positively portray the press as a
dialogue builder-a critically important distiller of societal information and
shaper of community conversations through the application of editorial
insight and journalistic acumen. In striking down a Florida "right to reply"
statute in Miami HeraldPublishing Co. v. Tornillo,20 the Court wrote:
A newspaper is more than a passive receptacle or conduit for news,
comment, and advertising. The choice of material to go into a
newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on the size and
content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and public

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 573.
420 U.S. 469 (1975).
Id. at 491.
Id. at 492.
Id.
418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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The Court noted that this role of the press as a builder and structurer of
community dialogue was constitutionally ordained and constitutionally
protected, indicating that "[i]t has yet to be demonstrated how
governmental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised consistent
with First Amendment guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to
this time."22 Other cases echoed this sentiment, with the Court highlighting
the success the media has in creating these public conversations, calling the
press "a mighty catalyst in awakening public interest in governmental
affairs" 23 and characterizing it as an entity "specifically selected" by the
Constitution "to play an important role in the discussion of public
affairs."2 4
C. Characterizationsof the Press as Watchdog
Finally, and overwhelmingly, the Glory Days Supreme Court
characterizations of the media depict the press as a watchdog-a critical
check on government that performs an essential "Fourth Estate" function.25
The media is portrayed as an entity that has both the skill and the mandate
to "expos[e] corruption among public officers and employees."2 6 The
Supreme Court told us that in this role the media forms a "foundation" of
democracy, because "the basic assumption of our political system [is] that
the press will often serve as an important restraint on government."27 In
Mills v. Alabama,2 8 the Court indicated that "the press serves and was
designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any abuses of power by
governmental officials and as a constitutionally chosen means for keeping
officials elected by the people responsible to all the people whom they
were selected to serve."29 Later, in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart,30
it reiterated these sentiments, characterizing the checking function of the

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 258 (footnotes omitted).
Id.
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965).
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966).
See, e.g., Potter Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 634 (1975). For a

discussion of some cases highlighting this feature of the press and an argument that it is a
"constitutional function" unique to press speakers, see Sonja R. West, The Stealth Press Clause, 48 GA.

L. REV. 729, 753 (2014).
26.
Estes, 381 U.S. at 539.
27.
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585 (1983).
28.
384 U.S. 214.
29.
Id. at 219.
30.
427 U.S. 539 (1976).
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press as "impressive," and praising the media's "record of service over
several centuries" on this front.3 1 According to the majority in that case, in
the criminal trial setting, the press "does not simply publish information
about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice" by watching over
the behaviors of judges, prosecutors, and other court officials and ensuring
that they act appropriately.32 The media again is characterized as
imminently worthy of trust in its own editorial decisions about how and
when to engage in newsgathering and publication and is depicted as a
vitally important social entity-"the handmaiden of effective judicial
administration." 3 3
In many respects, the holding in New York Times v. Sullivan was driven
by this same Fourth Estate characterization, with the Court
constitutionalizing libel law by way of lofty language about giving citizens
who were speaking through the media the "breathing space" to contribute
to this valuable checking function. 3 4 The Sullivan opinion is a deeply
romanticized ode to the power and promise of a watchdog media. Indeed,
as I have noted elsewhere,35 the Court delivered this media characterization
by echoing words of the Founders. Its Sullivan opinion borrowed from
Madison in its depiction of the press, asserting that across the nation, "the
press has exerted a freedom in canvassing the merits and measures of
public men, of every description." 3 6 It underscored the time-honored view
of the media as the keeper of this crucial role, noting that "[o]n this footing
the freedom of the press has stood; on this foundation it yet stands."37
Jefferson is quoted for the reminder that, given the positive societal
contributions of the press, Congress may not "controul [sic] the freedom of
the press." 38
D. CharacterizationsThat Remained Positive Despite PressFailings
These Glory Days characterizations are forceful, consistent, and largely
unyielding. Indeed, even when presented with strong counter-narrativeswith press-freedom values pitted against "other values society ordinarily

31.

Id. at 560 (quoting Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966)); see also Jones, Press

ClauseDicta, supra note 6, at 711.

32.
33.
34.

Stuart, 427 U.S. at 587.
Id. at 560 (quoting Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 350).
See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964).

35.

See Jones, Press Access, supra note 9, at 1791; Jones, Press Clause Dicta, supra note 6, at

712.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 275 (quoting 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 570
36.
(1876) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES]).
Id. (quoting ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 36, at 570).
37.

38.

Id. at 277.
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wishes to see protected quite vigorously, like the rights of criminal
defendants, reputational rights, and rights of privacy" 39-Or
when
confronted with evidence of press behavior gone awry or concerns about
inaccuracy, sensationalism, or unfairness, the Supreme Court's
characterizations during the Glory Days remained overwhelmingly
positive.
In Time, Inc. v. Hill,4 0 the Court characterized the press as so
"essential ... to healthy government" that our open society "places a
primary value on freedom" for even a less-than-responsible press. 4 1
"Depicting the media as an earnest, hardworking institution that performs
an 'indispensable service . .. in a free society' and that needs latitude to
make some errors in the course of its important work, the Court expressed a
deep fear of unnecessarily 'saddl[ing] the press' with impossible burdens of
verifying facts with certainty."42 In the Glory Days cases, these errors by
the media are characterized as merely the cost of doing business in a
democracy. "Some degree of abuse," the Court said, "is inseparable from
the proper use of every thing [sic], and in no instance is this more true than
in that of the press." 4 3

Similarly, in Sheppard v. Maxwell," the Court speaks of the
"unqualified prohibitions laid down by the framers [that] were intended to
give to liberty of the press . .. the broadest

scope that could be

countenanced in an orderly society."A It characterizes the media's role as
so important that it "require[s] that the press have a free hand" regardless of
its occasional poor judgment or "sensationalism.A 6 In Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc.,47 the Court noted that there had in fact been abuses by
the free press of its constitutional freedoms, but it nevertheless
characterized the free press as a foundation of a free society:
We are aware that the press has, on occasion, grossly abused the
freedom it is given by the Constitution. All must deplore such
excesses. In an ideal world, the responsibility of the press would
match the freedom and public trust given it. But from the earliest

39.
Jones, PressAccess, supra note 9, at 1795 (footnote omitted) (citing cases in which the Court
favored press-freedom values in spite of the presence of competing values).

40.
41.

385 U.S. 374 (1967).
Id. at 388.

42.

Jones, Press Clause Dicta, supra note 6, at 712 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted)

(quoting Time, Inc., 385 U.S. at 388-89) (discussing the extensive praising dicta in Time, Inc.).
43.
Time, Inc., 385 U.S. at 388-89 (quoting ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 36, at 571).
44.
384 U.S. 333 (1966).
45.
Id. at 350 (alteration in original) (quoting Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 265 (1941)).
Id.
46.
47.
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971), abrogatedby Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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days of our history, this free society, dependent as it is for its
survival upon a vigorous free press, has tolerated some abuse.4 8
All told, the picture that develops in these Glory Days cases is an
overwhelmingly generous, sweepingly sentimentalized, almost uniformly
affirmative characterization of the press as a critically important, positively
contributing social entity that is worthy of protection and uniquely valuable
to the polity.
E. Declining Characterizationsof the Press
If we fast-forward only a few decades, however, the reversal in course
is stark. While the earlier era features a Court that appears to be going out
of its way to hear cases implicating the press and then going out of its way
to engage in lengthy positive characterizations of the press, the present era
shows the opposite on both fronts. As Professor Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky
noted in a recent assessment of the First Amendment jurisprudence of the
Roberts Court, 49 although the Court has recently addressed a number of
important free speech cases, the only decisions even possibly characterized
as free press cases are the two FCC v. Fox opinions, 50 both of which
"avoided the looming First Amendment issue they contained."5 1 The table
of cases in a standard media law textbook lists dozens of cases from the
1960s and 1970s and then has almost a complete famine of cases from the
2000s and 2010s. The paucity is not explainable by facts on the ground. It
is not the case that critical legal episodes involving the press are not
happening-quite the opposite. The early 2000s, for example, saw an
explosion of very high-profile confidential source and reporter's privilege
episodes arguably unparalleled even by the media law events of the Glory
Days.5 2 But the Court denied certiorari each time the issue came before it.53
Beyond this, when the Court does reach out to speak of the press and to
offer a characterization of it, the tone and quality are in diametric
opposition to what was seen in the earlier era. The most notable example is
found in Citizens United v. FederalElection Commission,54 a case that did
48.
49.
50.
Stations,
51.
52.

Id. at 51.
Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Not a FreePress Court?, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1819 (2012).
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307 (2012); FCC v. Fox Television
Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009).
Lidsky, supra note 49, at 1820.
See RonNell Andersen Jones, Avalanche or Undue Alarm? An EmpiricalStudy of Subpoenas

Received by the News Media, 93 MINN. L. REv. 585, 615-20 (2008).
53.
See, e.g., Lee v. Dep't of Justice, 413 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1187
(2006); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1150
(2005).
54.
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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not directly involve the press but followed the pattern of some Glory Days
cases, with the Court opting to reach out to describe the media in dicta. 5
This time, however, the Court offered a characterization of the press that
partook of none of the shining "otherness" that once was seen in the
Court's rhetoric. 56 The press was not depicted as an educator, a builder of
community dialogue, or a watchdog providing a constitutionally crucial
check on government. Indeed, the Citizens United majority outright
"rejected the proposition that the institutional press has any constitutional
privilege beyond that of other speakers."5 7 In the opinion, the media are
alternatively characterized as purveyors of a "24-hour news cycle" that is
"dominate[d]" by "sound bites, talking points, and scripted messages,"
and as players in an institution on the "decline" 59-amorphous and hard to
peg because given "the advent of the Internet and the decline of print and
broadcast media . .. the line between the media and others who wish to
comment on political and social issues becomes far more blurred." 60 Just
like all of the other corporations that the Citizens United majority
announced were free to engage in electioneering,61 media corporations
were depicted as "accumulat[ors of] wealth with the help of the corporate
form," 62 whose "views ... often 'have little or no correlation to the public's
support' for those views"63 and who carry the potential to "distort[]" the
political process.6 4 Gone are the optimism and confidence that undergirded
the former characterizations, replaced by cynicism, doubt, and, at its
extremes, distrust and animosity.6 5
III. POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR THE TREND

What might have changed to bring about this stark difference in the
press characterizations? The full explanation is almost certainly
multifaceted, with interrelated causal factors that are worthy of more
investigation than can occur here and that would benefit from careful
empirical evaluation. On the whole, however, there are at least three major
categories of explanations that might need to be explored: the
55.

56.
57.
652, 691
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

See Jones, Press Clause Dicta, supra note 6, at 714.

See Lidsky, supranote 49, at 1831-32.
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 352 (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S.
(1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
Id. at 364.
Id. at 352.
Id.
See id. at 381-82.
Id. at 351.
Id. (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990)).
Id. at 326.
Lidsky, supranote 49, at 1834.
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characterizations of the press have changed because the Court has changed;
the characterizations of the press have changed because the press has
changed; and the characterizations of the press have changed because the
public opinion or perception of the press has changed.
A. A Changing Court
One strong possibility is that the Supreme Court itself has changed in a
way that has impacted the press characterizations. The Roberts Court may
just be substantially less press-friendly than the Warren or Burger Courts
were-and thus would offer less positive press characterizations even if all
other factors remained constant and the factual world was on all fours with
the press contours of the past.66 The Justices on the current Supreme Court
who lean to the right ideologically might not find press freedoms to fit as
neatly within the libertarian strain of First Amendment jurisprudence that is
motivating many of the pro-free-expression decisions of the current
Court.6 7 Those who lean to the left ideologically may be less likely than the
civil rights era liberal Justices were to see the press as a part of a wider
social justice agenda 68-or might simply have less interest in that agenda as
a whole. Modem Justices, who have experienced the firestorm of
individually targeted press coverage that now accompanies almost every
nationally televised confirmation proceeding, may be less favorably
disposed overall toward the press than their predecessors were.69 It may be,
then, that the rhetoric about the press has changed because the authors of
that rhetoric have changed. Because most of the glowing language about
the press from the Glory Days was contained in nonbinding dicta,o this
new generation of Justices is not obligated to adhere to the press portrayals
of their predecessors, and the current Court may be opting to leave them
behind for ideological, jurisprudential, or personal reasons.

66.
67.

See id.; Erwin Chemerinsky, Not a Free Speech Court, 53 ARIZ. L. REv. 723, 734 (2011).
See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L. REv. 143, 145

(2010) (arguing that there is a trend of conservative Justices favoring free speech on a libertarian

principle of keeping government from intervening in the ideological market).
Id. at 144-45 (arguing that liberals on the Court favor free speech for reasons of political
68.
equality and protection of marginal speech).

69.
See Dahlia Lithwick, Their Own Private Hell, SLATE (Mar. 8, 2011, 6:09 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news and-politics/jurisprudence/2011/03/their-own_privatehell.html
(arguing that "the justices' own experiences with the media and their shrinking sense of personal

privacy" affects their First Amendment decisions, and that some "tend to view the American public and
the media largely through the prism of their own confirmation hearings-which they found to be
painful and humiliating").
70.

See Jones, Press Clause Dicta, supranote 6, at 709.
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B. A Changing Press
Second, perhaps the characterizations of the press have changed
because the press itself has changed. A great deal of transformation has
occurred in the American media landscape in the last fifty years, and at
least some of it may be contributing to this massive change in Court
characterization. Broadly speaking, there are two general strains of change
that are often suggested to be at play here. The first focuses on the
technology by which news is delivered, and the second focuses on the
quality with which news is delivered.
Technologically, much of the "press" that the Court might encounter
today is only a distant relative of the press that was the focus of the Glory
Days cases. The deteriorating "legacy" media are rapidly being replaced by
a wide variety of mechanisms of "citizen journalism,""7 which replicate
some of the key functions but very little of the form of their press
predecessors. An explosion of Internet and social media news sources,
some of which fulfill only portions of the role that the traditional, Glory
Days press fulfilled, have burst onto the information-conveyance scene in
ways that severely complicate a body of law that came into being when the
"press" meant three television news networks and a daily newspaper in
every major city. In many ways, this issue brings to mind the classic
Philosophy 101 thought experiment about the Ship of Theseus, which
imagines a ship that is sent to sea and then plank by plank has all of its
component parts replaced. When it returns, does it remain the same ship, or
is it something fundamentally different? 72 Likewise, the term "media"
today is attached to a wide range of individually targeted information
sources, and at least some significant aspects of today's press would be
wholly unrecognizable to the Glory Days Supreme Court. 73 The so-called
"disaggregation" of newspaper product means that news that was once
delivered all in a single newspaper is now being delivered through a wider
variety of media targeted to the particular consumer's reading
preferences. 7 4 This technological shift eliminates some of the opportunity
that the press of the Glory Days had to educate the public. It limits the
capacity of the legacy media to stand as a true proxy for the citizens or a

71.

See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Citizen Journalism and the Reporter's Privilege, 91 MINN. L.

REv. 515, 521-32 (2007); Adam J. Rappaport & Amanda M. Leith, Brave New World? Legal Issues
Raised by Citizen Journalism, COMM. LAW., Summer 2007, at 1, 1, 28-30.
72.
See Eric Thomas Weber, Proper Names and Persons: Peirce's Semiotic Consideration of
ProperNames, 44 TRANSACTIONS CHARLES S. PEIRCE SOc'Y 346, 351-52 (2008).
73.
RonNell Andersen Jones, Litigation, Legislation, and Democracy in a Post-Newspaper
America, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 557, 564-70 (2011) [hereinafter Jones, Post-Newspaper America]

(describing the "disaggregation" of news product that all once appeared in a single newspaper format
and the trend toward media that convey news but do not produce it).
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meaningful watchdog on behalf of the people. It unquestionably hampers
the media's ability to structure the conversations of the community as it
once did. While in the Glory Days, people "who went to [the newspaper]
for classified ads, movie listings, recipes, or sports stumbled upon the local
and national news along the way, and in so doing became a part of a wider
informed citizenry,"75 news consumers no longer have this experience
through the press. This feature of the Glory Days news consumption may
well have motivated a great deal of the positive rhetoric that the Court
attributed to the press in its characterizations from that time period. It is at
least possible that the shift in characterization is rooted in part in this shift.
A second possible way in which the press has changed since the
Glory Days is less centered on technology and more centered on quality. If,
as I have suggested, the Court's characterizations of the press have taken a
turn for the worse, one explanation that has to be entertained for that
change is that the press itself has taken a turn for the worse-that is, that
the Court in its rhetoric is simply accurately reflecting a real-world shift of
the media from responsible, careful educators of and watchdogs for the
populace to entertainment- and conflict-driven, partisan profit seekers who
are less stalwart or less professional in their work than their predecessors.
The institutional press has faced significant criticism on these fronts in
the last decade.76 Critics note that "press organizations must fight for their
piece of an ever-shrinking pie of revenue from consumers who enjoy
numerous low-cost or even free news alternatives" 77 and that "[t]he need to
compete for ratings results in an obsession with non-news, frivolity and
entertainment." 78 Thus, it is possible that the Court has not actually
reconsidered what it thinks about the primary, unique, constitutionally
designated role of the press, but rather that it has simply determined that
the modern press is not currently performing that role. It might have
concluded as a factual matter that the press is not doing the job of being a
trustworthy conveyor of information to the public and thus changed its
judicial characterizations accordingly.
Indeed, this explanation gets some additional support from the current
Justices' own more immediate experiences with the press. In recent years,
75.
76.

Id. at 565-66.
See Jones, Media Subpoenas, supra note 8, at 337-38 (detailing "[n]umerous well-publicized

scandals involving highly respected news organizations" and "a series of well-known incidents in which

journalists from the New York Times and USA Today fabricated stories, plagiarized the works of
competitors, or failed sufficiently to verify their sources," and citing commentary showing that these
episodes "negatively affected the public's perception of the ethics of journalists and reduced its
confidence that the news media will provide accurate and fair accounts of stories").
77.
DAVID A. YALOF & KENNETH DAUTRICH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE MEDIA IN THE
COURT OF PUBLIC OPINION 11 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2002).
78.
David L. Geary, The Decline of Media Credibility and Its Impact on Public Relations, PUB.

REL. Q., Fall 2005, at 8, 10.
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there have been several high-profile gaffes by the institutional media in
which the reporting of decisions from the Court has been sloppy or
erroneous. 79 Several Justices have publicly bemoaned what they see as the
generally poor performance of the press in covering the Court's work.o
These reactions make it very tempting to speculate that the Court is
changing its characterization of the press because the Court believes that
the modem-day press, in its day-to-day operations, is not doing a good job
of being press-like in the constitutional sense.
But there is a fundamental problem with this explanation. It would be
analytically inconsistent to suggest that the embarrassing or unsatisfactory
performance of the press is the sole or even primary reason for the radical
change in press characterization from the Court. This is because the Glory
Days Supreme Court already anticipated this contingency: The Court
repeatedly acknowledged that sometimes the press would be unwise,
disappointing, and fall short of its constitutional ideals, but the Court
concluded that it would stalwartly protect the press (and overwhelmingly
glowingly characterize it) anyway. 8' Separate and apart from whether that
position was correct, the fact that the position was vigorously and
consistently taken suggests that poor performance by the media is not what
is driving the about-face in the characterizations of the press. In light of the
Glory Days practice of positively characterizing the press despite its
widespread failings, it would be deeply contradictory to now point to a
pattern of disappointing press behavior as an explanation for the
precipitous decline in those characterizations.
C. A Change in Public Opinion
Finally, and relatedly, perhaps the change in Supreme Court press
characterization is linked to a change in public opinion of the press, and the
Court is mapping its views onto more widely held societal views that the
press is no longer valuable or laudable.

79.

See Michael Herz, The Supreme Court in Real Time: Haste, Waste, and Bush v. Gore, 35

AKRON L. REv. 185, 185 (2002) (describing chaos among reporters and journalistic errors in the
aftermath of the Court's decision in Bush v. Gore); Jeff Sonderman, CNN, Fox News Err in Covering
Supreme
Court
Health
Care
Ruling,
POYNTER
(June
28,
2012, 9:56
AM),
http://www.poynter.org/latest-news/mediawire/179144/how-journalists-are-covering-todays-scotus-

health-care-ruling/ (describing media blunders in reporting the Court's decision on the constitutionality
of the Affordable Care Act, including Fox News and CNN "both mistakenly report[ing] that the
individual mandate was struck down").

80.
See Jones, Press Access, supra note 9, at 1805 n.96 (summarizing comments from current
Justices that accuse the media of oversimplifying, sensationalizing, misleading the public, and
misinterpreting the actions of the Court).
81.
See supranotes 39-48 and accompanying text.

2014]

What the Supreme Court Thinks of the Press

267

There is abundant data pointing to this change in public opinion.
Polling during the Glory Days suggested that the public recognized and
appreciated the educator role of the institutional media, regularly
expressing widespread respect for and belief in the institutional media. In
May 1972, 68% of Americans reported that they trusted the mass media a
"great deal" or a "fair amount." 82 In contrast, a recent Gallup poll reported
the exact opposite: trust for the mass media in the United States was at an
all-time low, 83 with 60% saying that they trusted the media "[n]ot very
much" or not "at all." 84 While Glory Days polling indicated that Walter
Cronkite was the single most trusted man in the nation,85 today less than a
third of Americans report that they can believe all or most of what major
news anchors say.86 The news outlets themselves have also lost credibility,
with only "about two-in-ten say[ing] they believe all or most information
from" ABC, CBS, or NBC News.87 Indeed, in the last decade, all national
institutional press, both print and broadcast, experienced double-digit drops
in believability ratings.
Likewise, the public is experiencing sharp decreases in its faith in the
institutional media's ability to structure community conversations. From
1985 to 2011, the Pew Center for Research tracked an increasingly
negative opinion of news organizations on issues relevant to this function.
Compared to the Glory Days, many more people today believe that news
stories are often inaccurate,8 9 that news reports tend to favor one side, 90 and
82.

Joseph Carroll, Trust in News Media Rebounds Somewhat This Year, GALLUP (Sept. 27,

2005), http://www.gallup.com/poll/18766/trust-news-media-rebounds-somewhat-year.aspx.

83.
Lymari Morales, U.S. Distrust in Media Hits New High, GALLUP (Sept. 21, 2012),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/157589/distrust-media-hits-new-high.aspx.
In September 2013, the
numbers rose, but only slightly-with 55% saying they did not trust "very much" or "at all." See
Elizabeth Mendes, In U.S., Trust in Media Recovers Slightly from All-Time Low, GALLUP (Sept. 19,
2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/164459/trust-media-recovers-slightly-time-low.aspx.
84.

Morales, supranote 83.

85.
See YALOF & DAUTRICH, supra note 77, at 10 (reporting that in the 1970s, 73% of Americans
described Cronkite as "the most trusted figure in American public life").
86.
Media Use and Evaluation, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1663/media-useevaluation.aspx.
87.

THE PEW RESEARCH CENTER, AMERICANS SPENDING MORE TIME FOLLOWING THE NEWS 74

(2010), available at http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/652.pdf.
88.

THE PEW RESEARCH CENTER, FURTHER DECLINE IN CREDIBILITY RATINGS FOR MOST NEWS

ORGANIZATIONS 3 (2012), available at http://www.people-press.org/files/2012/08/8-16-2012-MediaBelievabilityl.pdf In the ten years studied, newspapers dropped as many as 19 points (Wall Street
Journal from 77% to 58%; New York Times from 62% to 49%; and USA Today from 67% to 49%). Id.
at 3. Major cable news outlets MSNBC, CNN, and Fox News dropped between 18 and 23 points. Id. at
4. The three major TV networks-ABC News, CBS News, and NBC News dropped between 13 and 17
points. Id. at 4. The smallest change in believability ratings was for National Public Radio (NPR),
which dropped 10 points between 2002 and 2012. Id.
89.
THE PEW RESEARCH CENTER, VIEWS OF THE NEWS MEDIA: 1985-2011: PRESS WIDELY
CRITICIZED BUT TRUSTED MORE THAN OTHER INFORMATION SOURCES 7 (2011) [hereinafter PEW,
VIEWS OF THE NEWS MEDIA], available at http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/9-22-

2011%2OMedia%2OAttitudes%20Release.pdf (noting an increase from 34% in 1985 to 66% today).

268

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 66:2:253

that the news is often influenced by powerful people and organizations.9 1
The public now overwhelmingly criticizes the press for its perceived lack
of fairness, 92 its unwillingness to admit mistakes, 93 its inaccurate
reporting,94 and its political bias. 95
The public's sense that the media is fulfilling its watchdog role has also
radically decreased. While Glory Days polling suggested large-scale public
confidence in this role, by 2009, 61% of Americans were "very concerned"
that the news media would not "fulfill its duties of providing oversight to
the public about what the administration is doing." 96 While polls from the
Glory Days showed that Americans overwhelmingly believed news
organizations helped democracy, recent polls show an equal number saying
that the media actually harms democracy. 97
The data in this area is so consistent and so compelling that at least
some piece of the explanation for the change in Court characterization of
the press over the past fifty years must be rooted in shifts in real-world
societal views and in colloquial characterizations of the behaviors and roles
of the American press over that same time period.
IV. WHY IT MATTERS
Whatever the cause-or, undoubtedly, causes-of this trend toward
less positive characterizations of the press by the Supreme Court, there are
likely to be ramifications.
First, and perhaps most obviously, if the Court no longer believes the
press to be a celebrated social institution, a performer of important
constitutional checking functions, a necessary shaper of community
dialogue, or an educator of or proxy for the public, we might expect a
continuation of the basic arc that we have recently seen: a hesitancy on the
part of the Supreme Court to take cases involving the press and a hesitancy
to view the press favorably when the Court does offer a characterization of
it. If, as appeared to be the case in the Glory Days, positive
characterizations motivated (or at least accompanied) positive legal
90.
Id. (noting an increase from 53% in 1985 to 77% today).
91.
Id. (noting an increase from 53% in 1985 to 80% today).
92.
Id. at 6 (finding that 77% of respondents shared this view).
93.
Id. (finding 72% of respondents shared this view).
94.
Id. (finding 66% of respondents shared this view).
Id. (finding 63% of respondents shared this view).
95.
96.
Media Use and Evaluation, supra note 86 ("Based on those who think the news media are not
being tough enough on the Obama administration.").
97.

PEW, VIEWS OF THE NEWS MEDIA, supra note 89, at 10. ("For the first time in a Pew

Research Center survey, as many say that news organizations hurt democracy (42%) as protect
democracy (42%). In the mid-1980s, about twice as many said that news organizations protect
democracy rather than hurt democracy.").
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outcomes for the press, negative characterizations may well be harbingers
of the opposite.
To the extent that any of the Glory Days rhetoric resonates as either
legitimate descriptively or desirable normatively, this loss of an inclination
to support the newsgathering or public-informing work of the press is cause
for concern. Abandonment of any Fourth Estate mindset at the Court
threatens to hamstring a significant premise of our democracy and to
disincentivize the investigative, watchdog, and public-proxy behaviors that
have been foundational to the functioning of communities.98 As Justices of
the Supreme Court have contended99 and as empirical data on the behaviors
of working journalists 0 0 confirms, when legal structures to protect
newsgathering and news publication are absent, certain newsgathering and
news publication simply will not occur.
At a time when those who once investigated the news, uncovered
corruption, and informed the community conversation are struggling to find
financial models that will allow the continuation of those pursuits,10 1 it
seems very risky to also rob them of legal models that support those
pursuits. A negative Supreme Court characterization of the press thus might
be expected to have a correspondingly negative effect on the operation of
the journalistic enterprise and, concomitantly, on the many Americans who
consume that journalistic work product.
Less obviously, though, there is another risk at stake. Left unchecked,
these trends in press characterization could threaten to impoverish a much
wider body of First Amendment rights. The U.S. Supreme Court's
jurisprudential pattern has always been that general speakers and press
speakers rise and fall together.1 0 2 On the rising side, "[a] sizable amount of
vital constitutional doctrine in this country developed as a result of
constitutional cases in which mainstream media companies, often
newspapers, aggressively fought for fundamental democratic principles that
had public benefits beyond the scope of the individual [press] litigants'
successes."

03

98.
Jones, Media Subpoenas, supra note 8, at 393 (discussing survey data on journalist responses
to lapses in legal protection and reporting that they fear "that the inevitable result is a very practical
limitation on the watchdog function that most newsroom leaders still see as a vitally important aspect of
their work").
99.
See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 728 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (discussing
how the lack of legal protection can deter the gathering and publishing of information by the press).
100.
See Jones, Media Subpoenas, supra note 8, at 354-74 (describing empirical data on news
editors' reports of the impact on newsgathering practices of a lack of legal protection).
101.
See Jones, Post-Newspaper America, supra note 73, at 562-68 (describing the sharp
financial decline of American newspapers).
102.
West, supra note 25 at 730 (observing that the press "has shared not only its victories with
the public but also its defeats").
103.
Jones, Post-NewspaperAmerica, supra note 73, at 571.
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In the Glory Days cases, media litigants were common "legal
instigators" who brought many cases to the Court that ultimately enhanced
the individual liberties of communicative individuals not affiliated with the
105
media.1 04 Thus, for example, in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,
"[t]he holding was not a narrow press victory based on media-specific
rights. Rather, it was a bold statement on the needs of 'people in an open
society' and the value of public observation of government proceedings."l 06
The holding, by its clear terms, was applicable to "everyone" who wishes
to invoke the newly announced First Amendment right, and not merely to
the positively-characterized members of the press who brought the case
that produced the holding.' 0 7
The newspapers, at the time, had what it took to get that holding-the
financial resources to litigate the case, 0 8 the institutional incentive to press
for the rights,' 09 and, importantly for the current purposes, the goodwill
engendered from decades of positive Court characterizations of the press as
a valuable First Amendment entity. This goodwill motivated the Court to
take these kinds of cases in the first instance and then gave the Court
positive instrumental views of the First Amendment freedoms when it
decided the cases. The team for whom the Court was eager to act as
cheerleader was the positively-portrayed press. But the true winners in the
game were all citizens, who gained the constitutional right to attend a
criminal trial as a result of the press-focused decision.
I have written elsewhere about the many times in which this pattern
repeats itself in First Amendment law." 0 The positively-characterized Press
Enterprise newspaper was responsible for the Supreme Court announcing
that all citizens, not just the press, have a right of access to preliminary
hearings and voir dire proceedings."' The positively-characterized
Nebraska Press Association'1 2 brought the case that gave the Supreme
Court the opportunity to make bold statements about the presumptive

104.

I have written extensively about this elsewhere. For further examples, and for more details

on the examples shared here, see Jones, Post-Newspaper America, supra note 73, at 571-80 ("These

legal instigators ... were singularly responsible for moving the U.S. Supreme Court to recognize
widespread categories of rights that are vital to the nation's participatory democracy.").
105.
448 U.S. 555 (1980).
106.
Jones, Post-Newspaper America, supra note 73, at 573 & n.65) (quoting Richmond
Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 572 ("People in an open society do not demand infallibility from their
institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited from observing.")).
107.
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575.
108.

109.
110.
111.
Enterprise

See Jones, Post-NewspaperAmerica, supra note 73, at 617-18.

Id. at 613-14.
See generally id.
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-EnterpriseII), 478 U.S. 1, 14 (1986); PressCo. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise1), 464 U.S. 501, 505 (1984). See also Jones, Post-

Newspaper America, supra note 73, at 575-78.

112.

Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
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unconstitutionality of governmental prior restraints in all settings, not just
settings involving the media." 3 Indeed, New York Times v. Sullivan itself
went the distance in constitutionalizing the law of libel through the vehicle
of a press entity that the Court characterized as laudable and historically
worthy of protection.'1 4 Each of these cases-like the others discussed
above-is marked by the presence of a body of press-praising rhetoric that
helps the Court on its way to a declaration of wider constitutional rights
that can now be enjoyed by all speakers.
This pattern-of the Court setting forth a "bedrock of press-supportive
dicta on the way to a press-prevailing but all-speaker-protecting
conclusion" 1s-is
notable for reasons well beyond those substantive
conclusions. It is a pattern that highlights how thoroughly connected the
Court's positive conception of the media has been to the development of
wider First Amendment doctrine in this country. And while the positive
characterizations of the press have mostly enhanced our broader freespeech rights in the past, the new, negative conception of the media may
risk the impoverishment of those wider rights going forward. At a
minimum, this downward trend in characterizations is worthy of a broader
dialogue than the one that is focused on what the trend means for the
media. A myopic focus on the impact that the apparent judicial change of
heart might have on the working journalists who are no longer depicted
positively is risky, because it disregards the symbiotic nature of press
freedoms and speech freedoms. It ignores the power that the positively
characterized press has managed to wield on behalf of speakers everywhere
and the potentially stark consequences of a retraction of that power. The
scholarly conversation therefore must include a recognition that, because
the rights of general speakers and press speakers crescendo and
decrescendo together, wider First Amendment values that have been
enhanced in cases brought by the positively characterized media could be
diminished as the Court's view of the press diminishes.

Jones, Press Clause Dicta, supra note 6, at 710 (noting that "the holding centers on the
113.
broad free-speech principle that the government bears a 'heavy burden' of justifying any decision to
impose a prior restraint on speech); id. at 710-11 ("Nebraska Press Association is, without question, a
precedent that guarantees this freedom from governmental prior restraint regardless of the character of

the restrained speaker, rather than a media-focused holding about the contours and applicability of the
Press Clause.").
Id. at 711-14.
114.
115.
Id. at 713.

